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Trust in pension institutions is pivotal in making pension decisions, like saving or enrolling in 
pension programs. But which traits of pension institutions matter in making or breaking trust 
in providers like pension funds, banks or insurance companies? This paper presents an 
empirical analysis of the underlying forces of trust in private pension providers in the 
Netherlands. Based on a large-scale survey among pension participants, we show that the 
perceived integrity, competence, stability, and benevolence of pension providers matter in 
assessing the trustworthiness of pension providers. Pension funds are more trusted than banks 
or insurance companies, a difference that is primarily related to weights attached to perceived 
levels of integrity and stability. Second, higher educated participants have a significantly 
higher propensity to trust pension providers than lower educated. Third, transparency as 





The pension systems in Europe are in a state of flux (OECD, 2013). The financial 
sustainability of pension arrangements has been a structural worry for governments for years 
as a consequence of population ageing. The financial crisis has put even more pressure on 
governments and private pension providers to address the fallibilities of funded pension 
schemes (Casey, 2012). Pension entitlements and promises were tacitly perceived as certain 
but the crisis revealed the inherent uncertainty in financial contracts.  The trust that workers 
and pensioners have put in pension providers was being put to the test. In that respect the 
definition of trust by Gärling, Kirchler, Lewis, and Van Raaij (2009) succinctly captures the 
essence of the function of trust, namely “the experience of certainty where no real certainty 
can exist.” The need for trust remains as high as ever as pension reforms increasingly shift 
risks to individuals (Quinn and Cahill, 2016) and therefore they have a greater stake in being 
concerned about how pension providers handle their money. Handling risk requires for most 
people professional expertise offered by financial institutions. However, the reputation of 
these institutions has been seriously damaged by imprudent and sometimes fraudulent actions 
over the years. During and after the credit crunch of 2008 financial institutions have been 
trying to restore the trust level they enjoyed well before the onset of bank runs and financial 
scandals. Expertise, integrity and benevolence have been seriously questioned in public 
debates, especially of banks (Jansen, Mosch, and van der Cruijsen, 2015; van der Cruijsen, de 
Haan, and Jansen, 2016). 
Understanding trust in pension providers and related institutions is of utmost 
importance. Not only because such research offers a reality check for pension professionals 
how they are perceived, but more importantly it may explain why people are hesitant to put 
their life savings in the hands of private-sector professionals, why they do not seek financial 
advice, or why they have not saved enough to meet their needs or expectations (Taylor-
Gooby, 2005; Vickerstaff, Macvarish, Taylor-Gooby, Loretto, and Harrison, 2012; Henkens 
et al., 2017). The central research question in this paper therefore concerns the very basic 
question: what makes and what breaks the trust that pension participants have in pension 
providers?  
Although pension insiders discuss and underscore the importance of trust in pension 
institutions (Besley and Prat, 2005; Hyde, Dixon, and Drover, 2007; Schanz, 2009) the 
concept of trust and its underlying dimensions are rarely measured and examined empirically 
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in the academic literature. Trust is generally seen as the essential ingredient in making 
societies work and there is ample macroeconomic evidence of the importance of generalized 
trust for economic growth and well-being (Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Beugelsdijk, De 
Groot, and Van Schaik, 2004; Zak and Knack, 2001). At the micro level the importance of 
trust and its underlying forces are far more difficult to establish. As Vickerstaff et al. (2012) 
make abundantly clear in their review of the literature on trust in pensions there is “a 
surprising lack of literature on how individuals differentiate between different pension 
products and their providers.” (p.30). Practitioners resort to making claims about controlling 
trust based on rules-of-thumb. For instance, trust activities are often translated in being 
transparent as a company and communicating in an open and clear manner about the provided 
services. However, some state that transparency is overrated (Pirson and Malhotra, 2008; 
Prast, Teppa, and Smits, 2012) or qualify this statement by saying that transparency matters 
only when basic trust conditions are met (Gärling et al., 2009).An open question is, of course, 
whether this is really so in the case of pension providers. The organizational trust literature 
offers some clues as to what may affect trust. For instance, Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 
(1995) make the claim that trust in organizations comes from fundamental character traits 
which the members of an organization possess, like ability, benevolence and integrity. In a 
review of trust in financial institutions in the wake of a crisis Gärling et al. (2009) extend this 
claim by including factors such as transparency, value congruence and reputation of 
organizations. In their view basic trust markers, such as ability, integrity and benevolence, are 
so-called ‘dissatisfiers’: not satisfying these criteria makes it hard for organizations to be 
perceived as credible and trustworthy. Markers such as the level of transparency or reputation 
of an organization are at best traits that help to differentiate or position the organization in the 
market for pensions. But more importantly, these markers are not going to generate 
trustworthiness and compensate a decline in the basic trust markers of an organization. 
Although these claims seem plausible, they have not been put to the test for the case of 
financial institutions in the trust literature. In designing social policies it is important to know 
which drivers are key and which markers are of minor importance. For instance, one can 
design huge advertising campaigns or protocols on how to communicate but when perceived 
integrity and competence are the root causes of distrust, money is ill spent. 
This paper makes three contributions. First, we extend the body of trust research in 
financial institutions by offering insight into the level of trust in a number of pension 
providers in the Netherlands, specifically pension funds, banks and insurance companies. 
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These are the pension institutions, which are relevant for understanding the second and third 
pillar of the pension system.  Second, we examine the impact of the different drivers of trust 
as mentioned in the organizational trust literature. And third, we show that there is a hierarchy 
in trust drivers as suggested by Gärling et al. (2009).  
The pension context is that of the Netherlands, a country which has received praise for 
its pension system (Ambachtsheer, 2011), but which is also experiencing difficulties in 
adjusting to structural changes in demography and the labour market. To understand the 
basics of pension provision in the Netherlands we will first give some background 
information on the Dutch system. Second, we will offer a brief overview of how to 
operationalize trust based on the literature on trust in organizations. Third, we will present our 
method and data on how we measured trust and the underlying drivers and subsequently 
present the results of our statistical analysis. Finally, we will conclude with a summary and 
discussion of the findings. 
 
A bird’s eye view of the Dutch pension system 
In order to understand the issue of trust in the Dutch context it is necessary to understand the 
governance in pension plans and the key players that figure in the provision of pensions. In 
the Netherlands most employees save and accumulate pension rights within a three pillar 
system: (1) a basic public pension plan (the so-called ‘AOW’); (2) a mandatory 
supplementary pension plan; and (3) individual voluntary pension savings.  
First pillar 
The first pillar offers every citizen of the Netherlands an equivalent benefit upon retirement. 
As of January 2016, a gross benefit of 1,138 euros per month is received by single 
individuals, and 784 euros is received by each member of a couple. The public pension is 
financed on a pay-as-you-go manner. Part of the income tax is earmarked (17.9% of the first 
30.000 euro on income) to generate the public pension income. In 2014 these public pension 
premiums covered 69% of the public pension outlay. This deficit is funded by the government 
from general fiscal means. Each resident accumulates for each year of residency (starting 50 
years before the public pension age) in the Netherlands 1/50 pension rights. As mentioned 
above pension premiums are levied over income earned and the government is responsible for 
making sure that contributions and benefits are managed prudently and the day-to-day 
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management of this process is delegated to the Social Insurance Bank. With respect to 
benefits, the main decision is whether or not to index pensions for (wage) inflation. The 
credibility of public pensions therefore rests mainly with the (federal) government which 
makes the key decisions. The most recent reform undertaken by the government concerns 
raising the retirement age in steps from 65 (starting in the year 2012) to 67 years in 2021 and 
from 2022  onward, the retirement age is automatically linked by the average life expectancy 
(at age 65). Based on population forecasts this implies that by the year 2060 the public 
pension retirement age would be 71.5 years.  
Second pillar 
The most complex pillar with respect to finance and governance is the second pillar, which 
constitutes of occupational pension plans (see Chen and Beetsma (2015)). These plans are 
agreed upon at a collective level between the so-called social partners: the employers or their 
representative organization and the trade unions, which represent the employees. Employees 
accrue pension rights which offer a supplementary income on top of the public pension. 
However, employees face some restrictions in accumulating those rights. Whenever their 
employer offers a supplementary pension program participation in that particular pension 
provider is mandatory.  
Although most Dutch employees accumulate their pension rights with pension funds, a 
small and increasing number of employees are covered by insurance companies. Pension 
funds are non-profit organizations, where key policy decisions are made by the so-called 
social partners: the employer(s) or their representatives and trade unions which represent the 
employees. Employees and pensioners of a pension fund can also be represented in the 
participants’ council, which gives solicited and unsolicited advice to the board of directors. 
However, in actual practice most funds (in 2014: 85%) have outsourced their administration 
and/or asset management to for-profit pension organizations. 
In the Netherlands approximately half of the pension premium is paid by the employer 
and the other half by the employee. By and large most Dutch employees have a defined 
benefit (DB) pension plan. In the past, these benefits were promised in terms of certain 
percentage (usually 70-75%) of an employee’s final pay based on 40 years of contribution. 
Over time, this ambition has been toned down to guaranteeing the benefit to a percentage of 
the average pay over the employee’s career. And during the last ten years, pension funds have 
come to realize that the promises they have made in the past were untenable. The increase in 
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life expectancy, the various crises on the stock market and since the Great Recession the 
historically low interest rates have made it difficult to match assets with future liabilities. 
Although most occupational pensions are characterized as DB plans, they can better be 
characterized as collectively defined contribution (CDC) plans as most pension contracts 
provide nominal guarantees, but the degree to which they are indexed depends on the funding 
ratio, the ratio of the pension fund’s assets over its liabilities. Liabilities are computed by 
discounting the future cash flows associated with the current stock of accumulated pension 
rights against a risk-free market interest rate. This discount rate used to be 4% but as of 2012 
the government has changed this rate to a market interest rate in order to free the system from 
arbitrary rates which did not reflect conditions on the capital market. The development over 
time of the funding ratio of Dutch pension funds is presented in Figure 1. This clearly shows 
the effects of a number of crises on the sustainability of pension funds. 
 
Figure 1: Average funding ratio of pension funds, The Netherlands 1987-2015 
 
Source: CBS, Statline, Note: a score of a 100 means that the pension assets exactly meet the pension liabilities. 
 
The 21st century has been a volatile period for pension funds which is a result of both the 
credit crisis and the subsequent crash on the stock market (see also Casey (2012) ) as well as 
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a funding ratio of 100 percent implies that pension funds have no resources to index the 
pension rights of participants for inflation. And to guarantee the promise of a pension which 
adjusts the value to the level of purchasing power, pension funds should have a funding ratio 
of 145 (Van Ewijk and Teulings, 2011).  
Third pillar 
Finally, there is a third pillar in which individuals can privately accumulate pension savings in 
case they find their pension inadequate. Voluntary pension savings are mainly effectuated 
through banks and insurance companies. This pillar is expected to become more important for 
a number of reasons. First, the government is pulling back as a (fiscal) sponsor for the second 
pillar arrangements. It restricts the coverage of gross incomes up to 100,000 euros (per 
annum) and political parties are hinting at lowering this income level to 70,000 euros or even 
lower. If employees want to maintain their expected benefit replacement rate, they have to 
save privately. Second, the number of self-employed individuals (without personnel) has 
grown significantly over the past 10 years in the Netherlands and for this type of workers 
there are in general no collective pension arrangements. However, many self-employed do not 
make pension arrangements because the pension premium – in the absence of the employer as 
sponsor – is twice as high as that of an employee. Third, the labour market has become more 
flexible and this is expected to increase even more. This aspect makes that certain funding 
practices that were well attuned to a labour market with low labour mobility and life-long 
contracts are perceived as perverse solidarity. In particular, the rule of pension funds to levy a 
contribution rate that is the same for all participants regardless of age, gender or income 
(uniform premium), as well as a uniform accrual rate of pension rights is seen as a form of 
perverse solidarity. 
Regulation 
The government has a dual role as regulator and as legislator. The task of regulating the 
pension sector has been delegated to two institutions: the Dutch central bank (De 
Nederlandsche Bank, DNB) and the Financial Markets Authority (AFM). The first institution 
regulates and monitors the pension funds as stipulated in the Pension Act and the life 
insurance companies as stipulated in the Financial Regulation Law. Financial prudence and 
stability are key aspects on judging the performance of pension providers and in impact the 
DNB is the most influential as it can force pension funds to change their policy if it is not 
acting prudently. The AFM monitors the pension sector on actual behavior of pension 
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providers, in particular whether participants receive correct information and whether 
providers act in the interest of consumers. 
Trust in pension providers 
The examination of trust in pension providers relies on a diverse body of literature on trust in 
organizations and institutions (Mayer et al., 1995; Vickerstaff et al., 2012), which draws on 
insights  of disciplines like economics, marketing, sociology, psychology, management and 
political science. The core of the matter in measuring and explaining trust revolves around the 
assumption that trust is both a trait of the trustee – perceived trustworthiness - as well as the 
person who has to trust others – the propensity to trust  (cf. Mayer et al. (1995)). The 
perceived trustworthiness is shown to consist of a multitude of characteristics, although in 
most studies the elements of ability, benevolence and integrity are central to understanding 
trust (Mayer et al., 1995; Pirson and Malhotra, 2008; Vickerstaff et al., 2012). However, it is 
believed that financial institutions merit a more special focus, perhaps because money – more 
than other services or commodities - is deep down a matter of trust. In a review on the 
underlying determinants of trust in financial institutions  Gärling et al. (2009) arrive at a 
number of drivers that relate to the general literature on organizational trust but which also 
includes other factors. We have used or made these drivers more specific to measure the 
drivers of trust in pension institutions. This amounts to the following set of trust drivers: 
 Stability: stability is a trait that is pivotal in the financial economist’s eye as pension 
finance revolves around managing assets and liabilities and the reputation as a pension 
provider depends crucially on delivering what was initially promised. Pension 
contracts in the Netherlands are by and large defined benefit contracts. Hence being 
perceived as a stable  provider might be seen as a reflection of the ability of a pension 
provider. Stability or predictability is expected to be intimately related to trust, 
although the two should be not be seen as equivalent concepts. One can act in a 
predictable and stable manner, but if these actions are detrimental to the interests of 
the participants one is not likely to be trusted. Hence, stability should be 
complemented by other drivers, as listed below. 
 Competence is the perceived ability of pension providers, or more specific the group 
of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a pension provider to offer a 
satisfactory level of services within the domain of pensions. This could be the 
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knowledge of the financial products and the ability to spread risks and hence to attain 
a smooth level of pension premiums and benefits. 
 Integrity is described in more general terms by Mayer et al. (1995) who define 
integrity as “the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that 
the trustor finds acceptable.” In applying the element of integrity to the financial 
sector, Gärling et al. (2009) describe it as “honesty and carefulness in procedures and 
treating all customers in the same way”.  
 Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the 
trustor, or who puts the interest of the trustor at least on an equal footing with their 
own interest. It is an element which is very much stressed by Shiller (2013) who 
claims that only business which serve their customers well will stay in business. It 
may involve giving advice and communicating from the client’s perspective and 
genuinely taking their interests at heart and not solely taking the perspective of the 
pension provider. 
 Transparency is defined in this paper as the quality by which a trustee reports to and 
communicates with the trustor. Transparency in general has more dimensions as it is 
said to cover both openness and the use of understandable information. It can also be 
seen as an indicator of integrity and benevolence. Being open and clear about what is 
going on inside an organization is a signal that an organization has nothing to hide. 
And offering complete and clear information about liabilities, procedures and inherent 
risks tied to products may be seen as a sign of benevolence as such actions show that 
organizations take the customer seriously. 
 Social responsibility: this trait could signify to stakeholders the level to which an 
organization is concerned with its own core competencies and priorities and therefore 
focuses on its own interest and stakeholders (Friedman, 1970) or whether it also takes 
a broader social concern into account in making decisions. By assessing this element 
in conjunction with the other markers, one might be able to uncover signs of value 
congruence (cf. how Gärling et al. (2009) use social responsibility as such) when 
organizations are perceived to take the perspective of society and not merely its own 
interests into account. 
In examining trust in pension providers we arrive at the following hypothesis: 
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Trustworthiness hypothesis: Trust in pension providers (pension funds, banks and insurance 
companies) is positively associated with indicators of their perceived competence, stability, 
benevolence, integrity, transparency and social responsibility. 
It is a straightforward hypothesis that can be put to the test. However, there is a  
second hypothesis which relates to the relative importance of the various factors. Gärling et 
al. (2009)  claim that the first four trust drivers – stability, integrity, competence and 
benevolence – are key to financial institutions. They are called ‘dissatisfiers’ (following the 
terminology of Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman (1959)). Often mentioned trust drivers 
like transparency or social responsibility can only be of value to a financial institution when 
the first four drivers are assessed in a positive manner. They are what Gärling et al. (2009) 
call ‘satisfiers’. By examining this sub-hypothesis one essentially focuses on the importance 
of size effects of the separate drivers of trust. 
Hierarchy-in-trust hypothesis: The perceived competence, stability, benevolence and integrity 
of pension providers are far more important than the perceived transparency and social 
responsibility of pension providers in generating trust. 
In testing our hypotheses, we will use a set of social demographic characteristic as 
control variables, to account for the fact that people differ in their propensity to trust pension 
providers. 
Methods and data  
Sampling and Participants 
In June 2014 a survey was carried out among pension participants in the Netherlands, (N = 
2,103, response rate 69%). For our purposes we focused solely on people who had 
accumulated pension rights at a pension fund (N = 1,735). The survey was conducted by the 
CentERdata, a survey institute of Tilburg University that maintains a large panel of 
households in the Netherlands (for details, see http://www.centerdata.nl/en/). The panel is 
representative of the Dutch population with respect to sex, age, education, and regional 
variation. Members of the panel are all interviewed through an Internet connection. 
Participants who do not have Internet access are provided with a facility by CentERdata, 
allowing them to access the Internet through their televisions. Households that do not have a 
television set are given one by CentERdata to facilitate the data collection process. As such, 
there is no selectivity with regard to whether people have access to Internet or not. In general, 
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people participate for about four years on the panel, during which time they are interviewed 
regularly on a variety of different topics. When a respondent leaves the panel, a new 
respondent is selected on the basis of matched socio-demographic characteristics, so that 
representativeness of the sample will be maintained.  
 
Variables 
As dependent variable we measured respondents’ perceived trust in three types of pension 
providers: pension funds, banks and insurance companies. We asked the following question 
“To what extent do you trust [pension funds/banks/insurance companies] in guaranteeing a 
comfortable pension?”; answer categories are (1) no trust; (2) little trust; (3) neutral; (4) some 
trust; (5) a lot of trust. Hence we ask respondent s to express their trust in pension providers in 
general and not their own pension fund or their own insurance company.  
As explanatory variables the following set of variables is used: 
 
 Drivers of trustworthiness. We asked respondents the following question: “How  
would you characterize [pension funds/banks/insurance companies] in terms of the 
following elements?” Six elements of trustworthiness of pension providers were 
assessed by participants: (1) stability; (2) integrity; (3) competence; (4) benevolence; 
(5) transparency; and (6) social responsibility. For each of the trust drivers the 
respondents  were asked to assess the three pension providers on a five-point scale. 
For instance, for the dimension stability they could assess a pension provider as 
unstable (-2, -1), neutral (0), or stable (+1, +2); the values -1 and +1 are interpreted as 
moderate values of specific elements of trust.  For each of these trust markers we 
created four dummy variables. For example for the case of stability the dummy 
variables included “unstable”, “moderately unstable”, “moderately stable, and 
“stable”. The category neutral served as a reference category.  Control variables. To 
control for the characteristics of the trustor who makes the judgement of 
trustworthiness we use three variables: (1) age (in years); (2) education (three levels: 
low, middle and high); (3) gender. 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample used in this study. The average 
pension participants is 52 years old, there are slightly more men than women in the sample 
and the percentage of higher educated is higher than the national average, which stands to 
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reason, as we only focus on pension participants, i.e. people who accumulate pension rights in 
the second pillar.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Pension funds Banks Insurance companies 
Organization level 
variables 
Means St. dev. Means St. dev. Means St. dev. 
Trust* 3.35 1.06 2.91a 1.00 2.79a,b 1.00 
Trust markers*       
Stability 0.09 1.00 -0.08a 0.97 0.05b 0.90 
Integrity 0.24 0.94 -0.36a 0.95 -0.34a 0.91 
Competence 0.35 0.92 0.30 0.90 0.31 0.86 
Benevolence -0.05 1.07 -0.93a 1.01 -0.83a,b 1.00 
Transparency -0.02 1.02 -0.37a 0.92 -0.43a,b 0.90 
Social reponsibility 0.10 0.97 -0.48a 0.95 -0.43a 0.87 
       
Individual level 
variables 
      
Age categories (years) 52.47 15.87 52.47 15.87 52.47 15.87 
Gender (male = 0) 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50 
Education (3 cat.) 2.25 0.80 2.25 0.80 2.25 0.80 
 
N = 1735.  
* Note: In the table significant differences (p < 0.05) between the means of the trust variables and trust markers 
are denoted by (a) where the pension funds are used as benchmark and (b) with differences between banks and 
insurance companies. The trust variable is a 5-point variable 1-5. The evaluation of trust markers is based on a 
five-point scale -2, -2, 0, +1, +2.  
 
 
The assessed level of trust are of a qualitative or ordinal nature and to analyse the trust 
assessments of respondents properly we use ordered logit analysis. 
 
Explaining trust in pension providers 
In the Netherlands trust in pension institutions has shown to be characterized by a marked 
swing in ups and downs, but also by a consistency in evaluation across the various providers.  
Over the years we have tracked the development of trust of various pension providers and 
Table 2 shows the development over time of the most prominent institutions between 2004 




Table 2: Trust in pension institutions, 2004-2014 (percentage of the general population 
who (very much) trust specific institutions) 
 2004 2006 2009 2011 2014 
Pension funds 53 64 44 42 48 
Banks 32* 37* 25 34 30 
Insurance companies 32* 37* 18 20 25 
Government 37 42 45 41 41 
* In 2004 and 2006 the trust question was posed for jointly for banks and insurance companies as a lot of large 
corporations at that time were conglomerates offering both insurance and banking services. After the crisis some 
organizations unraveled and to reflect this trend a separate trust question was posed for both banks and insurance 
companies. 
Source data: NIDI (2004-2014) 
 
To offer a benchmark in the comparison of institutions we also include the government as the 
provider of public pensions. Government is moderately trusted and there was only one period 
in which the government was seen as the most trusted institution and that was in the midst of 
the credit crisis, when virtually all Dutch banks had to be supported by government 
guarantees and some were even nationalized (like the bank ABN AMRO) as they were seen 
as a risk to the (Dutch) financial system. However, the most notable observation of Table 2 is 
that for each and every year banks and insurance companies are seen as far less trustworthy 
compared to pension funds.  
To get a deeper understanding of why pension funds differ markedly from banks or 
insurance companies we have asked pension participants to characterize the various pension 
providers relevant in the second pillar of the pension system along the six dimensions as 
suggested by Gärling et al. (2009). The result of this characterization can be found in Table 3. 
Although the providers share some similarities in the eyes of participants, one can see the 
pension funds as a whole are evaluated markedly different from banks and insurance 
companies. In particular with respect to traits such as integrity and benevolence pension funds 
are clearly seen as institutions which are more honest and more engaged to put the customer’s 
position first than banks or insurance companies. For example, only a small minority of 
respondents view pension funds as dishonest (4.3%) or moderately dishonest (14.3%). The 
corresponding percentages for banks (12.3% and 31.2%) and insurance companies (10.3% 
and 32.0%) are far more negative. Some differences can also be traced in terms of 
transparency and social responsibility, with pension funds being more transparent and acting 
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more socially responsible than banks and insurance companies. With respect to stability the 
three institutions do not differ much: for each institution the participants are more or less 
divided about how stable these institutions are. The same can be said of the assessed 
competence of the three pension providers. This observation suggests that competence and 
stability are both elements that approximate the ability of these institutions. 
 
Table 3: Trust in financial intermediaries in pensions by pension participants 
Characteristics Evaluation 
       
Stability Unstable Moderate Neutral Moderate Stable Total 
   Pension funds 6.2 21.8 35.7 30.1 6.3 100.0 
   Banks 7.8 25.8 35.9 27.9 2.5 100.0 
   Insurance 4.6 21.4 41.1 29.0 3.2 100.0 
Integrity Dishonest Moderate Neutral Moderate Honest  
   Pension funds 4.3 14.3 42.0 31.6 7.8 100.0 
   Banks 12.3 31.2 38.4 16.3 1.7 100.0 
   Insurance 10.3 32.0 40.9 15.2 1.6 100.0 
Competency Incompetent Moderate Neutral Moderate Competent  
   Pension funds 3.1 13.0 38.5 36.5 8.9 100.0 
   Banks 3.9 11.7 41.4 36.3 6.8 100.0 
   Insurance  3.2 10.6 44.7 35.5 6.1 100.0 
Benevolence Focused on 
organization’s 
interest 




   Pension funds 10.4 21.4 37.4 24.1 6.7 100.0 
   Banks 34.3 36.2 19.2 8.8 1.5 100.0 
   Insurance 28.3 38.6 22.0 9.6 1.5 100.0 
Transparency Unclear 
communication 
Moderate Neutral Moderate Clear 
communication 
 
   Pension funds 8.6 21.6 38.8 25.3 5.8 100.0 
   Banks 11.4 32.4 39.7 14.9 1.6 100.0 





Moderate Neutral Moderate Socially 
responsible 
 
   Pension funds 6.0 16.0 45.4 27.4 5.2 100.0 
   Banks 16.1 31.1 38.4 13.3 1.2 100.0 
   Insurance  13.0 30.4 44.6 11.0 1.0 100.0 
N = 1735 
 
In order to examine the determinants of trust, we formulated two hypotheses. The 
trustworthiness hypothesis assumes that  all six traits of organizations are - at some level – 
positively associated with trust in pension providers . The hierarchy of trust hypothesis 
predicts that the dissatisfiers, like stability, integrity, competence and benevolence, are far 
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more important than the satisfiers, like transparency and social responsibility. The results of 
the ordered logit analyses to test  these hypotheses are  presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Ordered logit analysis of trust in pension institutions by pension participants 
 Trust of pension participants in: 
 Pension funds Banks Insurance companies 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Characteristics institutions: Coëf. t-value Coëf. t-value Coëf. t-value 
Stability (neutral = 0)       
    Unstable -1.98** 6.64 -1.00** 3.82 -0.65* 2.11 
    Moderately unstable -0.89** 6.02 -0.34* 2.49 -0.19 1.36 
    Moderately stable 0.65** 4.39 0.72** 5.30 0.72** 5.48 
    Stable 1.16** 3.96 1.41** 3.44 0.35 1.02 
Integrity (neutral = 0)       
    Dishonest -1.59** 4.24 -1.46** 6.07 -1.78** 6.99 
    Moderately dishonest -0.81** 4.55 -0.76** 5.45 -0.93 6.86 
    Moderately honest 0.50** 3.34 0.71** 4.25 0.73 4.33 
    Honest 1.43** 4.86 0.82 1.56 2.14** 3.80 
Competence (neutral = 0)       
    Incompetent -0.89* 2.13 -0.30 0.93 -0.54 1.51 
    Moderately incompetent 0.03 0.19 -0.14 0.82 0.04 0.21 
    Moderately competent 0.68** 5.02 0.27* 2.25 0.24* 1.94 
    Competent 1.36** 5.32 0.55* 2.27 0.14 0.54 
Benevolence (neutral = 0)       
    Interest organization first -0.63* 2.53 -0.58** 3.17 -0.94** 4.98 
    Moderately organ. first -0.18 1.23 -0.06 0.43 -0.45** 3.18 
    Moderately cust. first 0.25‡ 1.72 -0.37‡ 1.76 -0.28 1.43 
    Interest customer first 0.63* 2.15 0.40 0.83 -0.45 0.94 
Transparency (neutral =0)       
   Unclear communication 0.20 0.86 -0.20 0.91 -0.35 1.55 
    Moderately unclear -0.01 0.04 -0.08 0.65 0.07 0.55 
    Moderately clear 0.26‡ 1.75 0.28 1.61 0.08 0.45 
   Clear communication -0.17 0.58 0.58 1.12 -0.06 0.10 
Social responsibility (neutral=0)       
   Not socially responsible -0.23 0.77 -0.54* 2.73 -0.51* 2.31 
   Moderately not responsible -0.28 1.65 0.19 1.42 -0.06 0.46 
   Moderately responsible 0.20 1.35 0.35 1.89 0.58** 3.01 
   Socially responsible 0.63‡ 1.85 1.28‡ 2.04 0.89 1.40 
       
Control variables:       
Education (low = 0)       
   Middle 0.26‡ 1.88 0.34** 2.55 0.32* 2.37 
   High 0.59** 4.62 0.52** 4.22 0.21‡ 1.71 
Gender (male = 0) -0.22* 2.19 -0.07 0.71 -0.04 0.37 
Age (in years) 0.03** 8.10 0.00 0.49 -0.01‡ 1.82 
Controlled for randomization 
questionsa 
√ √ √ 
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.21 0.19 
N = 1735 1735 1733 
‡ < 0.1 * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.   
(a) To come to independent assessment of the pension providers, we randomized the order in which one of the 
three providers appeared to respondents. In the statistical analysis we controlled for this as the order of one of 





The overall outcome of this test is that we find strong support for our first hypothesis – the 
trustworthiness hypothesis. Most of  the traits of organizations are - at some level -– 
positively associated with  drivers of trust in pension providers.1 In particular, stability, 
integrity, competence, benevolence and social responsibility proved to be a statistically 
significant predictor of trust.  The notable exception is the level of transparency – the level of 
communication of organizations – is not significantly  (at p < 0.05) associated with trust in the 
three organizations. 
The first column of Table 4 presents the analysis of trust in pension funds and these 
results show all drivers are of some influence, although clearly stability and integrity are 
dominating factors, whereas the influence of transparency and social responsibility is weak. 
With respect to the dominating factors for pension funds one should note that trust is 
especially vulnerable to perceptions of integrity and stability. The coefficient for being 
unstable in the case of pension funds is a factor 1.7 larger than the coefficient for being stable 
and this asymmetry suggests that participants ‘punish’ pension funds more heavily for 
perceived instability, whereas for the other drivers one can detect more symmetrical effects. 
The control variables - education, gender and age – are statistically significant in the 
case of pension funds. The higher educated are more trusting towards pensions funds, and the 
same applies to male participants. It is well known within the literature on generalized trust 
that the educational level or intelligence is positively associated with trust (Carl and Billari, 
2014, Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, Soutter,  2000). This finding may be a reflection of the 
complexity of the pension industry, which is perhaps easier for higher educated and more 
financially literate to grasp than for the lower educated (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014).  
 The fact that age plays a significant role in trusting pension funds may perhaps be a 
reflection of the status quo: by and large, pension funds have been the default intermediary to 
arrange a supplementary pension and up and till the credit crisis pension funds had been 
highly trusted institutions that could always make good on their promises. And finally, it 
could also be a reflection of the fact that the older participants are relatively better off in terms 
of their pension package and rights compared to younger generations, who face an uncertain 
future. 
                                                     
1 We have checked for possible multicollinearity in the explanatory factors by carrying out variance inflation 
factors (vif) and for all trust markers the vifs were 2 or lower, which is well below to the limiting benchmark 
values  often used in statistics (O’Brien, 2007), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem in carrying out 
the ordered logit analysis. 
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The second and third columns show the results for trust in banks, respectively 
insurance companies. The weights attached to stability, integrity and competence are very 
much alike for these two providers. It is however, noteworthy to see that the both institutions 
are evaluated equally negative in terms of benevolence, the insurance companies are 
‘punished’ for this assessment in terms of trust, whereas banks are not. The fact that this 
asymmetry is clearly visible for the case of insurance companies when one focuses on 
benevolence is also telling and understandable. Insurance companies and banks have a history 
in the Netherlands of miss-selling insurance products starting in 1990s (van Dijk, Bijlsma, 
and Pomp, 2008) and resolving this scandal is still going on today.2 The different weights 
may also be the result of the fact that participants can leave a bank when they are dissatisfied 
about their services, but the relationship with insurance companies (and this applies also to 
pension funds) refer generally to contracts which cover a lifetime. Putting the interests of 
customers first is in that case pivotal to trusting such providers. Perhaps that also explains 
why social responsibility is more important in the case of insurance companies than in the 
case of banks. It suggests that value congruence is a factor that could be decisive factor for 
insurance companies in establishing trust with pension consumers. A final remark with 
respect to the propensity to trust in the case of banks and insurance companies. Age and 
gender do not play a role of significance. However, just like the case of pension funds, the 
educational level of trustors matters and this is a robust finding across all pension providers: 
the higher educated are far more trusting of these institutions than the lower educated.  
The size and significance of the various factors in Table 4 suggest that stability and 
integrity are the most important factors in the establishment of trust and thereby provide 
support for the hierarchy-in-trust hypothesis. To illustrate the relevant hypotheses of drivers 
for the various pension providers we carried out a simulation analysis (see Table 5) based on 
the ordered logit estimates of Table 4.  
Column 1 of this table offers the sample means as a benchmark. The real test of the 
hierarchy-in-trust hypothesis is to see whether trust can be substantially improved by factors 
like transparency or social responsibility (‘satisfiers’) when the key drivers or trust – stability, 
integrity, competence and benevolence (‘dissatisfiers’) – are assessed very negatively. 
 
                                                     
2 A similar conclusion about banks can be found in Jansen et al. (2014). Although they do not speak of fairness 




Table 5: Simulated trust levels for a number of scenarios with respect to trust markersa 
 Sample means Dissatisfiers = very 
negative, satisfiers = 
neutral 
Dissatisfiers = very 
negative, satisfiers = 
very positive 
Trust levels in: (1) (2) (3) 
Pension funds    
No trust 0.04 0.57 0.46 
Little trust 0.21 0.40 0.49 
Neutral 0.24 0.03 0.04 
Some trust 0.38 0.00 0.01 
A lot of trust 0.13 0.00 0.00 
    
Banks    
No trust 0.07 0.33 0.07 
Little trust 0.30 0.56 0.49 
Neutral 0.33 0.09 0.35 
Some trust 0.26 0.02 0.09 
A lot of trust 0.04 0.00 0.00 
    
Insurance companies    
No trust 0.08 0.47 0.28 
Little trust 0.34 0.48 0.60 
Neutral 0.33 0.05 0.10 
Some trust 0.22 0.01 0.02 
A lot of trust 0.03 0.00 0.00 
(a) Dissatisfiers = stability, integrity, competence, benevolence; Satisfiers = transparency, social responsibility. 
 
Column 2 shows what happens when the key drivers are very negative and the satisfiers are 
neutral. One can see for all pension providers that distrust is the distinguishing outcome of 
such a constellation. And this column should be compared to column 3 which shows the 
movement from a neutral position to a very positive assessment of the satisfiers. For instance, 
the group of pension participants that perceive the core values of a pension fund – stability, 
integrity, competence and benevolence – very negatively and who are neutral with respect to 
the satisfiers (transparency and social responsibility) has little (40 percent) to no trust (57 
percent). When we assume  that  their view become very positive with respect to the satisfiers, 
the overall stance of this group is still very distrustful: 49 percent has little trust and 46 
percent has no trust.  The effect of these movements in trust drivers does not lead to a 
fundamental change in trust – most participants remain distrustful – , which can be seen as 
further support for our hierarchical trust hypothesis : there exists a hierarchy in trust drivers. 
Trying to repair a bad reputation by solely claiming excellence in transparency or by being 
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socially responsible is not going to generate trust at a very deep level. People only become 
slightly less distrustful.  
Conclusions and discussion 
The idea that trust is pivotal to the wealth of nations, organizations and individuals is slowly 
but gradually gaining recognition. Without trust transactions break down or can only be 
facilitated at very high transaction costs (Williamson, 1993). The incompleteness of 
contractual arrangements is a facet of everyday life, but it is especially prevalent in the 
domain of pensions where governments and financial intermediaries provide contracts which 
rely on financial obligations which covers a large part of the life course of individuals. Such 
obligations are bound to be imprecise as numerous risks (inflation, longevity, bankruptcy, 
interest rates, etc.) can become real and distinct. Trust is therefore crucial for the functioning 
of pension systems or more broadly the financial industry (Van Raaij, 2016). Trust is a 
complex phenomenon  and this complexity is also reflected in the diverse theoretical and 
empirical approaches in capturing the “elusive notion of trust” (Gambetta, 1988). To unravel 
this elusive notion we have made the effort to focus on the drivers of trust that are often 
ascribed to financial intermediaries (Gärling et al., 2009). This paper has three findings to 
offer that are of interest to both academics and practitioners.  
First, we show by means of a survey among pension participants in the Netherlands 
that underlying core traits of pension institutions, such as ability, integrity, benevolence, 
competence, matter.  
Second, within the set of drivers of trust stability and integrity are the most important 
indicators, followed by the benevolence, competence and social responsibility of pension 
providers. Transparency is often stressed by corporate executives in building trust as being of 
significant importance, but in our estimations it is of little or no importance. 
A third finding, is that trust is not solely a reflection of the pension provider – the 
trustee - but also of the person who gives trust – the trustor. A robust finding across all 
pension providers is that higher educated are far more trusting of these institutions than the 
lower educated. And in the case of pension funds, it appears that the older participants are 
significantly more trusting than younger age groups. Whether this is a trait tied to generations 





In this paper we restricted our attention to six drivers - of which some of these drivers deserve 
a more in-depth treatment as there may be more dimensions than meets the eye. For instance, 
transparency is often translated into the quality of communication of an organization, but the 
value of being open and frank about one’s policies may also be a sign of integrity. 
A second limitation is that the survey has a cross-sectional setup which limits our 
focus to understand how trust differs between persons. A natural and more interesting 
extension of this research would be to focus on the differences within persons or how trust 
develops within a person. As Vickerstaff et al. (2012) also notice in their review of the 
literature it is important to see how trust is gained, sustained or lost. This makes a longitudinal 
setup necessary. 
A third limitation is that we have not developed variables that might approximate the 
propensity to trust. People with different experiences, cultural backgrounds, education, or 
personality types will vary in their propensity to trust or their general willingness to trust 
others. The same may be applicable to the issue of pension finance. To trust an organization 
to handle your affairs depends on your experience, your acknowledgement that others might 
know better and, for instance, whether you have some anxiety in disclosing information to 
others (Van Dalen, Henkens and Hershey, 2017). In theory the propensity to trust is how one 
in general trusts other people or organizations (Mayer et al., 1995). However, such a measure 
is bound to be correlated with the specific trust in pension providers and for the purpose of 
this paper we have handled it by controlling for a variety of factors which might indirectly 
capture these influences. 
Discussion 
The key findings offer food for thought, in particular for financial organizations as the credit 
crunch and the ensuing crisis have been detrimental to their trustworthiness. The problems 
and dilemmas are not specific to the Dutch pension system and can be encountered in many 
countries. Most organizations immediately respond to declines in trust by claiming that they 
should be more transparent and consultants are apt to cater to those needs. Listen to what, 
e.g., CEO Nilsson of a UK pension consultancy firm has to say:  
“The UK pensions market has suffered from high costs, lack of alignment of interests, and poor 
performance for many years, which has led to a lack of trust in the industry. The key issue here is 
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the lack of transparency when it comes to charges. Many savers do not realize the true costs of 
their pensions as the charges are hidden or presented in such a way as to suggest they are not as 
harmful, while in reality they continue to eat into savings of millions of those saving for 
retirement.”  (stated on 18 July, 2012) 
The quote does not serve to downplay the importance of transparency – which is a real issue - 
but it demonstrates how professionals inside the pension industry make tacit claims about 
drivers of trust and their assumed importance. As Pirson and Malhotra (2008) have argued 
transparency is an overrated element in building trust and other elements of trust should be at 
the center of attention. Furthermore, Kirby (2012) makes a point that is of some importance in 
an age in which risks and decisions are shifted towards individuals: “The real problem might 
be that, as time goes on, consumers are increasingly being placed in situations where they are 
forced to trust—and they resent that.” When this is the case, integrity of an organization may 
very well be of far greater importance to clients than an organization that is completely 
transparent in reporting its business model and the underlying costs or charges. Most 
consumers may simply be not interested in reading this information as that they are either 
unable to comprehend the wealth of information or because they rather focus and spend their 
time on more pressing problems (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013). This paper is one of the 
first to suggest that in the greater scheme of establishing trust (perceived) integrity and 
stability are key traits on which pension participants base their trust.3 However, one should 
also be aware that part of the trust or distrust people have in pension providers is hard wired 
and connected to their propensity to trust. In other words, organizations which try to become 
trustworthy by investing in aspects of integrity or stability will only partially reap the benefits 
of this strategy as increasing trustworthiness depends also on the trustors – their clientele - 








                                                     
3 There are some similar approaches in financial services marketing, like the Financial Trust Index run by the 
Nottingham University Business School (see, e.g., (Ennew and Sekhon, 2007)), although they do not, as 
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